The Devil's Advocate approach:an interview technique for assessing consistency among deceptive and truth-telling pairs of suspects by Deeb, Haneen et al.
Running head: THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH     1 
 
The Devil’s Advocate Approach: An Interview Technique for Assessing Consistency among 
Deceptive and Truth-telling Pairs of Suspects 
 
Haneen Deeb1,2*, Aldert Vrij1, Lorraine Hope1, Samantha Mann1, Sharon Leal1,  
Pär-Anders Granhag2, Leif A. Strömwall2 
 
1University of Portsmouth, Department of Psychology, United Kingdom 
2University of Gothenburg, Department of Psychology, Sweden 
 
 
 
Author Note 
This research was supported by the Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctorate Programme in 
Legal Psychology, Award 2014 - 0678.  
We would like to thank Tonislava Asparuhova, Gerges Dib, and Lavinia Pontigia for 
their assistance with this research. 
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest. 
*Requests for reprints should be addressed to Haneen Deeb, Department of Psychology, 
University of Portsmouth, King Henry I Street, PO1 2DY, Portsmouth, United Kingdom. 
Telephone: 0044 (0) 23 9284 6312. Fax: 0044 (0) 23 9284 6300. Email: 
haneen.deeb@port.ac.uk. 
  
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH  2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose. The aim of this study was to assess statement consistency in pairs of deceptive and 
truth-telling suspects when the Devil’s Advocate approach is implemented. This approach 
involves asking suspects an ‘opinion-eliciting’ question for arguments that support their opinions 
followed by a ‘devil’s advocate’ question to elicit opposing arguments. On the basis of the 
confirmation bias and impression management literatures, we predicted that truth-telling pairs 
would provide more consistent arguments in response to the opinion-eliciting question than to 
the devil’s advocate question. Deceptive pairs were expected to be equally consistent with each 
other in response to both questions. 
Method. Forty-nine pairs of participants were matched, based on their strong opinions about a 
controversial topic, and were asked to either tell the truth or lie about their opinions to an 
interviewer. Pair members were permitted to prepare for the interview together. Each participant 
was interviewed individually with the Devil’s Advocate approach. 
Results. Prepared truth-telling pairs were more consistent with each other in response to the 
opinion-eliciting question than to the devil’s advocate question. However, and as predicted, 
deceptive pairs were equally consistent with each other in response to both questions. 
Conclusions. The Devil’s Advocate approach seems to be a promising interview technique for 
assessing consistency among pairs who hold false opinions and pairs who hold true opinions. It 
also has implications for the consistency heuristic as consistency is not diagnostic of deception or 
honesty unless the interview technique is taken into consideration. 
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The Devil’s Advocate Approach: An Interview Technique for Assessing Consistency among 
Deceptive and Truth-telling Pairs of Suspects 
In light of violent attacks by extremist groups (Soufan, 2011; Weiss & Hassan, 2015), it 
is essential for intelligence and security officers to identify the nature of suspect affiliations to 
political, ideological, and religious organisations. Often, militant extremists work in cells so they 
travel and launch their attacks in small groups (Turretini, 2015; White, 2014). They may travel as 
couples such as the San Bernardino shooters (“San Bernardino Shooting: Who Were the 
Attackers?,” 2015) or they may pose as refugees, such as the Paris Attackers (“Paris Attacks: 
Who Were the Attackers?,” 2016). Officers who suspect and question individuals at checkpoints 
may need to assess whether suspects hold views that support extremist organisations (e.g., the 
so-called Islamic State) or not. In the current study, we examined an interview technique that 
may assist officers in uncovering false opinions of pairs of suspects: the Devil’s Advocate 
approach.    
In the Devil’s Advocate approach interview (Leal, Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2010), suspects 
are asked two types of questions: One about their opinions on a topic (the opinion-eliciting 
question) and another for which they are asked to take the ‘devil’s advocate’ position and 
generate arguments that run counter to their opinions (the devil’s advocate question). In a 
deception scenario, truth-tellers are likely to provide their truly held opinions in response to the 
opinion-eliciting question, whereas liars are likely to provide their truly held opinions in 
response to the devil’s advocate question.  
Theoretical Framework for the Devil’s Advocate Approach 
Confirmation Bias 
Attitudes are activated in line with one’s experience with the target object, and these 
attitudes are often maintained by confirmation bias (Ajzen, 2001). Individuals selectively attend 
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to evidence that supports their views , and at the same time, ignore evidence that runs counter to 
their views, because they deem opposing evidence to be weaker than supporting evidence 
(Edwards & Smith, 1996; Felton, Garcia-Mila, & Gilabert, 2009; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
Their reactions eliminate the discomfort of having to confront contrary evidence and enable them 
to maintain their own attitudes which in turn reduce cognitive dissonance (Petty, Wegener, & 
Fabrigar, 1997). This cycle sustains individuals’ views and enhances their access to arguments 
that support those views.  
Therefore, if individuals are asked to generate arguments for a topic about which they 
have strong views, they would find it easier to generate supporting than opposing arguments 
(Ajzen, 2001; Nickerson, 1998). Truth-tellers interviewed with the Devil’s Advocate approach 
should be able to provide arguments in response to the opinion-eliciting question as these 
represent their genuine opinions. Given that individuals ignore arguments that refute their 
opinions, it would be difficult for truth-tellers to generate arguments for the devil’s advocate 
question. A similar pattern may be true for liars who would have easier access to arguments that 
support their genuine views in response to the devil’s advocate question than to opposing 
arguments for the opinion-eliciting question. Nevertheless, as described in the following section, 
liars can also have access to arguments for the opinion-eliciting question if they employ counter-
interrogation strategies to make an honest impression on the interviewer. 
Impression Management 
 In forensic contexts, both liars and truth-tellers want to convince the interviewer they are 
innocent, but they employ different strategies to achieve this goal (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). According to the self-presentation perspective, truth-
tellers may change their behaviour to make an honest impression on the interviewer, but they do 
that within the boundaries of honesty (DePaulo et al., 2003). Examples of this strategy include 
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waiving their rights to silence and being forthcoming (Hartwig et al., 2010; Kassin, 2015; Luke 
Dawson, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2014).  
Liars’ change in behaviour is designed to mislead the interviewer. Liars invest more effort 
than truth-tellers in self-presenting themselves positively, and they employ a variety of counter-
interrogation strategies to make their lie easier (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Leins, 
Fisher, & Ross, 2013). One commonly used counter-interrogation strategy is preparation. Liars 
think of questions that may be asked during the interview and rehearse responses to them 
(Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010). The importance of 
preparation is emphasised in manuals of extremist organisations, such as the Manchester Manual 
by Al Qaeda (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). Sample questions that are asked at airports or 
immigration checkpoints are provided in the manual, and members are encouraged to rehearse 
responses to them with their unit commander. They are also instructed to discuss information they 
may provide in case they are intercepted. Hence, extremists may prepare arguments that counter 
their opinions to demonstrate to the interviewer that they do not hold extreme views and that they 
are not affiliated with the extremist organisation (Soufan, 2011). This enables liars to provide 
arguments in response to the opinion-eliciting question when the Devil’s Advocate approach is 
implemented. In contrast, truth-tellers often do not prepare for the interview (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999; Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 2015b; Vrij et al., 2009, 2010), and hence they 
may have more difficulty providing opposing arguments in response to the devil’s advocate 
question.   
Another common counter-interrogation strategy used by liars is maintaining statement 
consistency. Liars attempt to maintain consistency in interviews to appear honest and they 
achieve that by preparing and rehearsing responses for anticipated interview questions (Granhag 
& Strömwall, 1999, 2002; Vrij et al., 2009). Research has shown that liars are at least as 
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH  6 
 
 
 
consistent as truth-tellers, which contradicts the commonly held belief by practitioners that 
consistency is a valid cue to deception (Greuel, 1992; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). These 
findings also contradict the widely employed consistency heuristic which assumes that 
consistency is associated with truth-telling (Granhag & Strömwall, 2001; Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Hartwig, 2005). Hence, it seems that practitioners fail to consider that liars want to appear 
convincing so they prepare and maintain consistency during interviews. 
Statement consistency may be a valid cue to deception but only when certain interview 
techniques are employed, such as strategically disclosing evidence (Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, 
& Hartwig, 2013b), imposing cognitive load (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2016; Masip, 
Blandón-Gitlin, Martinez, Herrero, & Ibabe, 2016), asking unanticipated questions (Vrij et al., 
2009), and employing different question formats (Deeb et al., 2017; Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012). 
These techniques have received empirical evidence demonstrating that they are effective at 
increasing interview difficulty for liars but not for truth-tellers, which eventually reduces liars’ 
―but not truth-tellers’― statement consistency. In the context of the Devil’s Advocate 
approach, however, the interview is not difficult for liars as they would have access to supporting 
arguments (their genuine opinions) and they would have prepared opposing arguments. Hence, it 
would be easy for them to maintain consistency within their statement (Granhag et al., 2013b; 
Strömwall & Willén, 2011). Truth-tellers, on the other hand, would find it difficult to generate 
arguments for the devil’s advocate question for which they did not prepare so, as they would not 
be concerned about consistency, they are not likely to be consistent in their responses to 
interview questions.   
Overall, impression management indicates that liars would provide arguments for both 
the opinion-eliciting and the devil’s advocate question which makes them appear consistent, 
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whereas truth-tellers would provide more arguments in response to the opinion-eliciting question 
than to the devil’s advocate question which reduces their statement consistency. 
The Devil’s Advocate Approach 
Leal and colleagues (2010) conducted the only study on the Devil’s Advocate approach. 
They examined differences between liars and truth-tellers for the number of details and for 
latency time. Truth-tellers’ statements featured more words and shorter latency time in response 
to the opinion-eliciting question than to the devil’s advocate question. Liars’ statements, on the 
other hand, did not differ on the number of words and latency time when responding to the 
opinion-eliciting and the devil’s advocate questions. In addition, truth-tellers were judged as 
more talkative, immediate, emotional, and plausible in their responses to the opinion-eliciting 
question compared to their responses to the devil’s advocate question. However, liars’ responses 
were judged similarly across questions in terms of being immediate, emotional and plausible.  
These findings may be explained by confirmation bias and impression management. 
Truth-tellers and liars had access to arguments that supported their views. Liars, however, were 
more concerned about impression management, and hence they may have attempted to maintain 
consistency by using accessible arguments to respond to the devil’s advocate question and 
rehearsed arguments to respond to the opinion-eliciting question. Accordingly, truth-tellers’—
but not liars’—responses to the opinion-eliciting and devil’s advocate questions differed from 
each other. These results suggest that liars’ responses to the Devil’s Advocate approach 
questions may be more consistent than those of truth-tellers. The current study examines this 
speculation.  
The Current Study 
The current study was designed to extend the findings by Leal and colleagues (2010) on 
the Devil’s Advocate approach to pairs of suspects by assessing within-group statement 
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consistency. The procedure involved matching pairs of participants who shared similar and 
strong opinions about a topic. After they were given the opportunity to prepare and were then 
separately interviewed with the Devil’s Advocate approach, the consistency of their arguments 
was measured. Within-group consistency is generally defined by the level of correspondence 
between statements from different suspects in a single case (Granhag, Rangmar, & Strömwall, 
2015a; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Hence, consistency indicated the extent to 
which pair members reported the same number of similar arguments to the opinion-eliciting 
question and to the devil’s advocate question. 
Previous studies have shown that truth-tellers do not tend to prepare together for an 
interview when given the opportunity (Vrij et al., 2009, 2010).  In those studies, however, truth-
tellers engaged in an event which they were asked to recall later in the interview. As they 
experienced the event, they may have believed they did not need to prepare for the interview. 
Recall of opinions, however, is more abstract than the recall of a single event, which is aided by 
episodic memory (Tulving, 1984).  Hence, truth-tellers may want to prepare to remember 
possible arguments for their opinions and to enhance impression management during the 
interview (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vernham, Granhag, & Mac Giolla, 2016; Vrij et al., 2010). 
Their preparation was predicted to involve responses to expected questions, and hence they 
would discuss arguments that support rather than oppose their opinions (Vrij et al., 2009). As for 
deceptive pairs, we expected that, in line with the deception literature on alibis and events 
(Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall, & Rangmar, 2013a; Vrij et al., 2009, 2010), they would 
prepare for the interview and anticipate they would be asked questions about their false opinions. 
Hence, they would be likely to prepare arguments that oppose their genuine views. Accordingly, 
both deceptive and truth-telling pairs would prepare responses for the opinion-eliciting question. 
Therefore, we expected truth-telling pairs who decide to prepare to discuss arguments that 
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supported their opinions, whereas liars would discuss arguments that opposed their genuine 
opinions (Hypothesis 1).  
As a result of confirmation bias, truth-telling and deceptive pairs would have more access 
to arguments that support their views, because individuals tend to ignore opposing arguments. As 
individuals who share similar views are able to provide similar arguments (Mercier & 
Landemore, 2012), truth-telling pairs should provide similar arguments in response to the 
opinion-eliciting question, whereas deceptive pairs should provide similar arguments in response 
to the devil’s advocate question. However, liars would also prepare arguments that oppose their 
genuine views, and hence are likely to provide similar arguments for the opinion-eliciting and 
the devil’s advocate questions. Accordingly, we predicted that truth-telling pairs would be more 
consistent with each other in response to the opinion-eliciting question than to the devil’s 
advocate question, but no such difference was expected for deceptive pairs (Hypothesis 2).  
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred (50 pairs) university students and staff members were recruited, through the 
departmental participant pool and announcements posted in the university buildings, to 
participate in a study that examined interactions between pairs discussing their opinions. 
Participants received a reward of either one course credit or £5 for taking part in the research. 
The sample included 82 females and 18 males, and their average age was 21.60 years (SD = 
5.97). 
A 2 (Veracity: truth-teller, liar) × 2 (Question Type: opinion eliciting question, devil’s 
advocate question) mixed design was used with veracity as the between-subjects factor, question 
type as the within-subjects factor, and prepared argument type and within-group consistency as 
the dependent variables.  
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Procedure 
Before their appointment, participants were sent an online questionnaire (adapted from 
Leal et al., 2010) that included 23 statements about controversial social and political topics (see 
Table 1). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a 
7-point scale (1= I disagree to 7 = I agree). The order of questions was counterbalanced between 
participants. Ratings were examined for extreme scores (1 or 7). Pairs who gave the same 
extreme rating for one of the 23 topics were matched and given an appointment at the same time. 
They were not informed about why or with whom they were paired, or about the topic they 
would be discussing during the experimental session.  
Table 1 about here 
On the appointment date, pairs were informed they had been chosen because they shared 
the same opinion on a specific topic, and they were to be interviewed separately by the same 
interviewer about their opinions regarding that topic. Each pair was randomly allocated to the 
truth or lie condition. Truth-telling pairs were instructed to discuss their genuine opinions when 
interviewed, whereas deceptive pairs had to claim they held opposing views (to their own 
opinions). All pairs were instructed that they needed to convince the interviewer that their 
opinions (either genuine or contrived) were true. To motivate participants to be convincing, they 
were informed that they would receive the course credit /£5 only if the interviewer believed 
them; otherwise, they would be asked to write about their opinions. In fact, all participants were 
rewarded and none was asked to write about their opinions. Pairs were given the opportunity to 
prepare for the interview as long as they needed. We timed how long it took each pair to prepare 
for the interview. 
Pair members were interviewed separately by one of two research assistants, both of 
whom were blind to the study hypotheses and to the participants’ actual opinions. The interviews 
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were audio-taped. Participants were first asked about their attitude towards the topic (whether 
they were in favour of, or opposed to, the topic). Then, they were asked the opinion-eliciting 
question (‘Why and what do you think led you to having this view on the topic? Please try to be 
as detailed as possible in your response.’), followed by the devil’s advocate question (‘Try to 
play devil’s advocate and imagine that you do not have this view at all. That is, imagine that you 
(dis)agree with the statement. What can you say in favour of this opposing view? Please be as 
detailed as possible in your response.’). Participants who did not provide at least three arguments 
for each of the questions were asked to do that. Previous research has shown that participants can 
typically generate at least three arguments in such tasks (Ajzen, 2001; Haddock, Rothman, & 
Schwarz, 1996; Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996). Also, obtaining at least three arguments allowed 
for a more accurate measurement of consistency between pair members.  
At the end of the interview, participants were asked to honestly complete a computerised 
post-interview questionnaire. They indicated their age and gender and rated on a 7-point scale 
their motivation to convince the interviewer of their opinions (1 = not motivated at all and 7 = 
very motivated), their belief that they would receive a reward/write down their opinions (1 = did 
not believe at all and 7 = definitely believed this), and the difficulty of the opinion-eliciting and 
the devil’s advocate questions (1 = extremely easy and 7 = extremely difficult). They were asked 
the following closed-ended questions: (a) Did you prepare for the interview with your partner 
(yes/no response options); and (b) Did you discuss with your partner arguments that (i) support 
your opinions, (ii) counter your opinions, (iii) support and counter your true opinion, or (iv) other 
[open-ended]. Moreover, participants were asked open-ended questions: (a) How did you 
prepare for the interview with your partner; and (b) What is the strategy you used to convince the 
interviewer of your responses to the opinion-eliciting/devil’s advocate question. After 
completing the questionnaire, all participants were remunerated, debriefed and thanked.   
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Coding 
All interviews were transcribed and then coded for information units. An information unit 
was either an argument or an aspect of an argument. Every information unit included at least one 
noun and one verb. For example, the statement ‘abusing cannabis is harmful for anyone’ was 
considered to be one information unit. The statement ‘a lot of cultures permit arranged marriages 
but these are more likely to be forced’ constituted two information units: ‘a lot of cultures permit 
arranged marriages’ as one unit and ‘these are more likely to be forced’ as the second unit. 
Similarly, the statement ‘if you are willing to move with someone means you are committed to 
them’ constituted two information units: ‘willing to move with someone’ and ‘you are 
committed to them’.  Every information unit reported by both pair members (by content, not 
verbatim) was considered a consistent argument. That is, if pair members mentioned the same 
argument regarding the topic, this argument was considered one consistent argument. For 
example, if one member reported ‘animals are more accessible than humans for medical 
research’ and the other member reported ‘animals are a lot easier to obtain than humans for 
medical research’, this was considered as one consistent argument. Similarly, ‘he generalises 
quite a lot’ and ‘he often describes groups of people using stereotypes’ was considered as one 
consistent argument. 
Two coders first counted the number of consistent arguments in three randomly selected 
pairs of interviews (n = 6). Disagreements were discussed and resolved. One coder coded nine 
other interviews (25% of the sample) whereas the second coder coded all the remaining 
interviews. An inter-rater reliability analysis indicated that the Intra-Class Correlation 
coefficients (ICC) were .68 for the opinion-eliciting question and .84 for the devil’s advocate 
question. The coefficient for the opinion-eliciting question is not high but demonstrates good 
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agreement in common with similar lie detection studies (Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2015; Vrij, 
2005; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012). 
One of the coders coded the responses for the open-ended questions in the post-interview 
questionnaire (participants’ preparation strategy with their partners and convincing strategies 
during the interview) and generated data-driven general categories (i.e. not predetermined) in 
accordance with the reported strategies. Responses by some participants were allocated to more 
than one category. Another coder allocated the responses to the adopted categories, and 
disagreements between the two coders were discussed and resolved.   
Preparation strategies were classified into three categories for liars and truth-tellers. For 
liars, the categories were: Discussing arguments, preparing convincing techniques (e.g., ‘we 
largely just discussed difficulties that we would come across and how to state our opinion 
without actually agreeing with it’; ‘we discussed how to sound convincing’), and other strategies. 
For truth-tellers, the categories were: Discussing arguments, discussing arguments only briefly, 
and other strategies. The other category for liars and truth-tellers included infrequently 
mentioned strategies such as writing down arguments and offering personal experience. Inter-
rater reliability was very high, ICC = .99 for truth-tellers and .92 for liars. 
Participants’ convincing strategies during the interview are displayed in Table 2. For the 
opinion-eliciting question, six categories emerged for truth-tellers and seven categories for liars. 
As for the devil’s advocate question, seven categories emerged for truth-tellers as well as for 
liars. The categorised strategies included an ‘other’ category which referred to strategies that 
were not mentioned frequently such as ‘was finding it difficult to respond’ or ‘attempting to 
control my behaviour’. For the opinion-eliciting question, inter-rater reliability was high, ICC = 
.97 for truth-tellers and .86 for liars. Regarding the devil’s advocate question, ICC = .88 for 
truth-tellers and .74 for liars. 
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Table 2 about here 
Results 
Before conducting the analyses, we screened the data for outliers. Cases with a z-score  > 
±3.29 were considered as outliers (Field, 2009). One case emerged as an outlier for within-group 
consistency across the opinion-eliciting question and the devil’s advocate question, so it was 
deleted. Hence, the assumptions for parametric tests were met and the final sample included 98 
participants with 50 liars and 48 truth-tellers (i.e., 25 deceptive pairs and 24 truth-telling pairs).  
Post-Interview Questionnaire 
Motivation. A t-test with level of motivation as dependent variable and veracity as the 
independent factor revealed that liars (M = 5.38, SD =1.52) and truth-tellers (M = 5.48, SD 
=1.11) did not differ significantly with respect to self-reported motivation to convince the 
interviewer, t(96) = .37, p = .715, d = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.47]. 
Another t-test revealed that both truth-tellers (M = 5.44, SD = 1.32) and liars (M = 4.75, 
SD = 1.67) believed they would receive a course credit or monetary remuneration for convincing 
the interviewer of their responses, but truth-tellers believed that to a significantly higher extent, 
t(96) = 2.26, p = .026, d = 0.46, 95% CI [0.06, 0.86]. A separate t-test showed that both liars (M 
= 4.52, SD = 1.48) and truth-tellers (M = 3.90, SD = 1.79) did not differ in the extent to which 
they believed they would have to write an opinion paper, t(96) = 1.88, p = 0.063, d = 0.38, 95% 
CI [-0.02, 0.78]. 
Perceived question difficulty. A mixed ANOVA on question difficulty with question 
type as the within-subjects factor and veracity as the between-subjects factor did not result in a 
significant effect for veracity, F(1, 96) = 0.20, p = .653, p2 = .002, but the question type main 
effect, F(1, 96) = 15.78, p < .001, p2 = .14, and the veracity x question type interaction effect, 
F(1, 96) = 55.28, p < .001, p2 = .37, were significant. Overall, the devil’s advocate question (M 
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= 4.56, SD = 1.74) was perceived as more difficult to answer than the opinion-eliciting question 
(M = 3.74, SD = 1.92). Regarding the interaction effect, simple effects analyses revealed that 
liars found the opinion-eliciting question (M = 4.58, SD = 1.75) significantly more difficult to 
answer than the devil’s advocate question (M = 3.84, SD = 1.75), F(1, 96) = 6.12, p = .015, 
whereas truth-tellers found the devil’s advocate question (M = 5.31, SD = 1.39) significantly 
more difficult to answer than the opinion-eliciting question (M = 2.87, SD = 1.70), F(1, 96) = 
63.75, p < .001. This is in alignment with the idea that people’s true arguments are more 
accessible than their counter-arguments.  
Preparation strategies. A chi-square test showed that liars and truth-tellers did not differ 
on whether they chose to prepare together before the interview, 𝜒2 (1, N = 98) = 0.13, p = .723, 
Cramer’s V = .01. Only six pairs of liars and six pairs of truth-tellers chose not to prepare at all. 
Among those who prepared, average preparation time was 3 min 48 s for deceptive pairs and 3 
min 00 s for truth-telling pairs, F(1, 47) = .91, p = .346, p2 = .02.  
To test Hypothesis 1, that deceptive pairs would prepare opposing arguments, whereas 
truth-telling pairs would prepare supporting arguments, we analysed differences between pairs 
for prepared argument type (arguments that countered, supported, or countered and supported 
their views). There was a significant association between veracity and prepared argument type, 
𝜒2 (3, N = 74) = 47.40, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .84. Among truth-tellers, 87.5% discussed 
arguments that supported their opinions, 9.4% discussed arguments that both countered and 
supported their opinions, and 3.1% discussed other types of arguments. Among liars, 57.1% 
discussed arguments that countered their opinions, 31.4% discussed arguments that both 
countered and supported their opinions, 5.8% discussed arguments that supported their opinions, 
and 5.7% discussed other types of arguments. Hence, Hypothesis 1 was supported.  
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We also looked at the preparation strategies employed by liars and truth-tellers. Among 
the 38 liars who prepared themselves for the interview, 50% reported discussing arguments in 
general, 39% reported preparing convincing techniques, and 3% mentioned other strategies. 
Among the 36 truth-tellers who prepared themselves, 53% reported discussing arguments in 
general, 25% reported discussing arguments only briefly, and 14% mentioned other strategies. 
Interview strategies. The frequencies in Table 2 show that when responding to the 
opinion-eliciting question, more truth-tellers than liars were honest, provided details, and 
attempted to seem passionate about the discussed topic, but more liars than truth-tellers tried to 
keep their responses simple and used standardised (commonly held) arguments to appear logical. 
As for the devil’s advocate question, truth-tellers reported providing details more than liars did, 
but liars tried more than truth-tellers to appear honest, include standardised arguments, disengage 
from their actual opinions, keep their responses simple, and maintain response consistency with 
the opinion-eliciting question. 
Within-Group Consistency Analyses 
As consistency of arguments between pair members would vary with the number of 
arguments provided, the total number of information units was included as a covariate in the 
analyses.1  
A mixed ANCOVA was conducted on within-group consistency with veracity as the 
between-subjects factor, question type as the within-subjects factor, and information units as the 
covariate.2 The analysis did not reveal a significant main effect for question type, F(1, 45) = 
1.73, p = .196, p2 = .04, or veracity, F(1, 45) = 1.97, p = .167, p2 = .04. However, we found a 
significant veracity × question type interaction, F(1, 45) = 4.42, p = .041, p2 = .09. 
Simple effects revealed that truth-telling pairs were more consistent with each other in 
response to the opinion-eliciting question (M = 3.17, SD = 2.26) than to the devil’s advocate 
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question (M = 1.33, SD = 1.05), F(1, 47) = 15.49, p < .001, d = 1.04, 95% CI [0.62, 1.47]. 
However, deceptive pairs were similarly consistent with each other in response to the opinion-
eliciting question (M = 2.24, SD = 1.54) and to the devil’s advocate question (M = 1.56, SD = 
1.16), F(1, 47) = 2.22, p = .143, d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.10, 0.90]. Hence, Hypothesis 2 was 
supported.  
As it is uncommon for truth-tellers to prepare for interviews, we compared pairs of truth-
tellers who opted to prepare (18 pairs) with truth-telling pairs who did not prepare (six pairs). 
The analysis was exploratory and cannot be generalised given that the group sizes were small 
and discrepant, preparation was not manipulated, and participants were not randomly allocated to 
group conditions. However, the analysis may prove useful for future research. A mixed 
ANCOVA on within-group consistency with preparation as the between-subjects factor, question 
type as the within-subjects factor, and information units as the covariate did not reveal 
significant main effects for question type, F(1, 20) = 0.55, p = .466, p2 = .03, and preparation, 
F(1, 20) = 0.07, p = . 796, p2 = .003, or a significant question type × preparation interaction 
effect, F(1, 20) = 2.81, p = .109, p2 = .12. This suggested that preparation had no effect on the 
results for truth-telling pairs. Yet, to be certain of this, we ran within-group comparisons for the 
prepared and unprepared truth-tellers separately. The analyses showed that truth-telling pairs 
who prepared themselves were significantly more consistent with each other in response to the 
opinion-eliciting question (M = 3.44, SD = 2.53) than to the devil’s advocate question (M = 1.17, 
SD = 0.86), F(1, 17) = 14.22, p = .002, d = 1.20, 95% CI [0.49, 1.91]. However, truth-telling 
pairs who did not prepare were consistent with each other in response to the opinion-eliciting 
question (M = 2.33, SD = 0.82) and to the devil’s advocate question (M = 1.83, SD = 1.47), F(1, 
5) = 0.43, p = .542, d = 0.42, 95% CI [-0.72, 1.56].  
Discussion 
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The current study extended the findings on the effectiveness of the Devil’s Advocate 
approach to pairs of suspects. As predicted, deceptive pairs were as consistent with each other in 
response to the opinion-eliciting as in response to the devil’s advocate questions. Deceptive pairs 
prepared for the interview and discussed arguments that opposed their genuine opinions, with 
some also discussing arguments that supported their opinions. They reported preparing 
convincing strategies and rehearsing arguments to make them seem real and consistent and hence 
honest. These reports corroborate previous findings that liars are concerned about impression 
management, particularly consistency (Deeb et al., 2017; DePaulo et al., 2003; Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008; Leins et al., 2012). These strategies are reflected in terrorist manuals, such as the 
Manchester Manual (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002) in which extremists are encouraged to 
prepare together for interviews in case they are apprehended so that they can provide convincing 
and consistent responses. Extremists’ preparations enable them to provide consistent arguments 
to the opinion-eliciting question. In addition, extremists are likely to find it easy to provide 
consistent arguments for the devil’s advocate question, because they are repeatedly lectured 
about their ideologies which ultimately results in attitude polarisation and conformity (Horgan, 
2014).  
Truth-telling pairs were more consistent with each other when they were asked to support 
their own opinions than when they were asked for opposing arguments. Additional analyses 
revealed this was particularly true for truth-telling pairs who prepared for the interview. Truth-
tellers may have needed to prepare briefly to generate specific arguments to support their 
opinions during the interview and eventually to make a positive impression on the interviewer. 
Indeed, the majority of truth-tellers reported having discussed supporting arguments, and 25% of 
them had very brief discussions aimed solely at remembering arguments (none of the liars 
mentioned preparing ‘briefly’ for the interview). Hence, unlike previous deception studies in 
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which truth-tellers often did not make use of the opportunity to prepare for the interview (e.g., 
Vrij et al., 2009, 2010), it seems that the abstract nature of opinions prompt truth-telling pairs to 
prepare. However, truth-tellers only prepared responses for the anticipated question: Opinion-
eliciting question. As people are generally less likely to have access to arguments that oppose 
their own views (Felton et al., 2009; Nickerson, 1998), truth-tellers could not provide similar 
arguments for the devil’s advocate question. Hence, they were less consistent with each other in 
response to this question than to the opinion-eliciting question.  
It may be argued that the within-pair consistency means indicate that deceptive and truth-
telling pairs exhibited a similar pattern, with higher consistency levels for the opinion-eliciting 
question than for the devil’s advocate question. However, as the analysis showed, this finding 
was more significant and the effect was larger for truth-tellers than for liars. Nonetheless, the 
similar pattern may make it difficult for practitioners to discriminate between deceptive and 
honest statements. This is a typical problem for deception detection, which remains one of the 
most challenging tasks in investigative interviewing (Vrij et al., in press). Research on deception 
detection has demonstrated that individuals are generally poor at accurately judging statement 
veracity, that judgments are made subjectively even in the presence of established criteria, and 
that several contextual factors such as counter-interrogation strategies employed by liars (Alison 
et al., 2014), experience with the reported event (Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Poletiek, 
2013), and individual differences (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996) affect suspect and interviewer 
behaviours (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Nahari & Vrij, 2015; Volbert & Steller, 2014). Whereas 
certain interview techniques (such as the interview technique used in this study) may enhance 
deception detection (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017), the 
effectiveness of these techniques may only be estimated but not determined (Vrij, 2016). Within-
subjects designs and baselining may assist in partially resolving this problem by controlling for 
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some factors such as individual differences and counter-interrogation strategies (Vrij, 2016). 
Accordingly, the within-subjects design utilised in our study has removed some extraneous 
effects.  
Also, we speculate that the effect of the interview technique would be more pronounced 
in real life due to suspects’ motivation and concerns about making an honest impression 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Hence, unlike innocent suspects, extremists 
who have several opportunities to rehearse responses (rather than only three minutes as in the 
current study) would be similarly consistent in response to the interview questions.  
These findings expand the literature on statement consistency. Previous research has 
shown that laypeople and professionals tend to employ the consistency heuristic by associating 
consistency with honesty (Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; Strömwall & 
Granhag, 2003). In contrast to these beliefs, our findings suggest that liars are more concerned 
about consistency than truth-tellers, and they invest more effort in maintaining high levels of 
consistency. Similar results have been obtained in previous research (Granhag & Strömwall, 
2002; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Andersson, 2004). Hence, practitioners are cautioned 
against the use of the consistency heuristic. Instead, they need to consider the interview context, 
particularly the interview technique, when assessing veracity based on consistency. Certain 
interview techniques such as the Strategic Use of Evidence (Granhag et al., 2013b) and imposing 
cognitive load (Vrij et al., 2012) reduce liars’ —but not truth-tellers’— consistency, so 
assessments may be made in line with the consistency heuristic. However, the Devil’s Advocate 
approach seems to reduce consistency among truth-tellers more so than among liars which 
contradicts this heuristic.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
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As reported earlier, the preparation analysis suffered from several limitations. Hence, 
these findings cannot be confirmed before future research systematically manipulates preparation 
prior to the interview to examine its effect on statement consistency. This may be achieved by 
providing only half of the participants (liars and truth-tellers) with the opportunity to prepare for 
the interview.  
We recruited pairs of strangers rather than pairs who were acquainted with each other. 
We expect that similar results would have emerged if acquaintances were recruited. Individuals 
become close to each other if they share similar attitudes (Gore, Cross, & Morris, 2006; Park & 
Shaller, 2005). This implies that acquaintances would be familiar with each other’s opinions and 
are hence likely to provide similar arguments that support their genuine views. Future research 
might investigate this assumption. 
Conclusions 
Deceptive pairs were consistent with each other in response to the Devil’s Advocate 
approach questions, whereas prepared truth-telling pairs were more consistent on the opinion-
eliciting question than on the devil’s advocate question. More research is needed before this 
approach is used in applied settings. However, the results corroborate previous findings 
contradicting the consistency heuristic. Hence, security and intelligence officers are warned 
against over-reliance on this heuristic when assessing suspect credibility.  
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Notes 
1The covariate (information units) and the independent variables (veracity and question 
type) were independent, and the relationship between the covariate and the dependent variable 
(within-group consistency) was linear for all groups. Hence, the assumptions of covariance were 
met and we were able to include information units as a covariate in the analysis.  
2Thirty six liars and 36 truth-tellers were prompted to provide at least three arguments for 
the opinion-eliciting questions, whereas 30 liars and 38 truth-tellers were given a similar prompt 
for the devil’s advocate question. Separate analyses conducted for responses provided prior to 
and following the prompt revealed similar results so we report the results for the complete 
statement (with at least three arguments).  
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Table 1  
Topics Participants Rated in the Opinion Questionnaire on a 7-Point Scale 
1) Women should have the right to an abortion 
2) Capital punishment (i.e. death penalty) should be a legal option in judicial systems for very 
serious crimes 
3) CCTV in streets and public areas is a good thing  
4) The UK immigration laws should be much tougher for anyone wanting to live in the UK 
5) I am firmly atheist (disbelief in God) 
6) The smoking ban in public places is a good thing 
7) Euthanasia should be a lawful option in the terminally ill  
8) Obese people should pay for their own healthcare 
9) It is right that animals are used for experimentation in medical research 
10) Governments should allow polygamy (marriage to more than one spouse)  
11) Sex before marriage is morally wrong 
12) Couples should not cohabit before being married 
13) I support the Labour Party 
14) Arranged marriages should be disallowed 
15) Telling young children that Father Christmas exists is wrong   
16) I generally agree with Donald Trump’s remarks 
17) I would not mind if the Prime Minister of my country was female 
18) It is okay for the minimum age for purchasing alcohol to be 18 years 
19) The inclusion policy at schools, whereby children with behavioural problems are kept in 
mainstream school classrooms, is a good thing 
20) I support the Conservative Party 
21) Governments should allow the use of cannabis for personal use 
22) The refugees’ crisis will have an increased negative influence on European nations 
23) I am happy that the Brexit campaign succeeded 
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Table 2 
Percentages of Convincing Strategies Reported by Truth-tellers and Liars for the Opinion-
Eliciting Question and the Devil’s Advocate Question 
 
Strategy Truth Lie 
Opinion Eliciting Question (OE)   
 Providing details 54% 34% 
 Being honest 28% 0% 
 Attempting to seem passionate about the topic 15% 8% 
 Controlling nonverbal behaviour 14% 13% 
 Thinking of standardised arguments/ Appearing logical 4% 18% 
 Taking the opposing perspective/ Reversing own views 0% 32% 
 Keeping it simple 0% 8% 
 Other 10% 14% 
Devil’s Advocate Question (DA)   
 Taking the opposing perspective/ Reversing responses to OE 58% 20% 
 Providing details 17% 8% 
 Disengaging from my actual opinions/ Including 
standardised arguments 
8% 28% 
 Being honest 6% 42% 
 Maintaining response consistency with OE 4% 30% 
 Keeping it simple 2% 10% 
 Other 4% 12% 
Note. Percentages are calculated for truth-tellers and liars separately. The total exceeds  
100% for each group because each participant could contribute to more than one category. 
 
